The Obstacles to the Modernization of Common Support Equipment by Ritschard, J. Erik
Air Force Institute of Technology 
AFIT Scholar 
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works 
3-2021 
The Obstacles to the Modernization of Common Support 
Equipment 
J. Erick Ritschard 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd 
 Part of the Aviation Commons, and the Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ritschard, J. Erick, "The Obstacles to the Modernization of Common Support Equipment" (2021). Theses 
and Dissertations. 5027. 
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/5027 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more 





































DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United 
States Government.  This material is declared a work of the US Government and is not 










Presented to the Faculty 
Department of Operational Sciences 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
Air University 
Air Education and Training Command 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Master of Science in Logistics and Supply Chain Management 
 
 






DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. 





































The current fleet of Common Support Equipment (CSE) is faced with a $2 billion 
funding disconnect that threatens nine of the twelve Core Functions of the United States 
Air Force. The purpose of this research is to identify and explore the factors within the 
sustainment, acquisition, and maintenance communities that exist as barriers to efforts to 
modernize CSE across the Air Force Logistics Enterprise. Using a qualitative, grounded 
theory methodology, this study explores the responses of interviewed Aviation Support 
Equipment managers responsible for the sustainment and modernization of CSE. The 
analysis exposed significant barriers to current modernization efforts, resulting in 
expensive, outdated, duplicative, and unreliable equipment in use across the Air Force. 
This research concludes that the Air Force must change the way CSE is administrated, 
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THE OBSTACLES TO THE MODERNIZATION OF COMMON SUPPORT 
EQUIPMENT 
 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
The Air Force pays $150,000 to refurbish a 1970s-era MJ-1 “Jammer,” though a 
brand new one costs $85,000 (Richards, 2020). Even more wasteful, the E4-B 
“Nightwatch” National Airborne Operations Center runs one of its engines around the 
clock on alert because the ground power cart available is too unreliable. This results in 
the unnecessary consumption of $1.5 million of fuel per month (Haralson, 2020). The 
HH-60G “Pavehawk” aborts 2% of its missions due to preventable radar altimeter 
discrepancies—the available commercial test set is not approved for Air Force purchase 
(Ray, 2020). These examples provide a small sample of the current state of Air Force 
Aviation Support Equipment: expensive, unreliable, and outdated. 
A large portion of equipment in-use today was designed and built in the 1960s, 
70s, and 80s—long before most currently-serving Airmen were born. This equipment 
breaks frequently and necessitates “Flightline Heroics” to accomplish the mission (Bobic, 
2018). Maintenance technicians and operators across the Air Force are keenly aware of 
the obstacles to their mission; hampered by bureaucratic processes and funding 
constraints that prevent their highest priorities from being addressed (Bobic, 2018). 
Aviation Support Equipment (AvSE) performs a vital role in the weapon system 
hierarchy of every aircraft (Swain, 2021). The DoD defines AvSE as: all equipment, 
whether mobile or fixed, necessary to support the operation and maintenance of a weapon 
system in every operational circumstance, environment, and level of maintenance 
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(Taylor, 2020). Common Support Equipment (CSE) consists of all items of AvSE that are 
utilized by multiple weapon systems. CSE’s current portfolio contains more than 533,000 
end items, with 53,000 unique stock numbers valued at over $13 billion (Sillence, 2020; 
Haralson, 2020).  
Nine of the twelve Core Functions of the Air Force are directly supported by 
CSE. Without adequate CSE support, the missions of Air Superiority, Command and 
Control, Education and Training, Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance, Global Precision Attack, Nuclear Deterrence Operations, Personnel 
Recovery, Rapid Global Mobility, and Special Operations are not possible (Sillence, 
2020).  
Three distinct Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) organizations hold 
responsibility for the management of CSE under the authority of program action directive 
(PAD) and Air Force Instruction (AFI) HQ AFMC/A4 (PAD 07-13), AFSC/635 SCOW 
(PAD D16-03), and AFPEO/ACS (AFI 63-101_20-101) (Sillence, 2020). These three 
organizations form the management “triad” responsible for the cradle-to-grave lifecycle 
management of all CSE assets.  
Functioning as the Weapon System Team (WST), HQ AFMC/A4M (referred to as 
A4M), provides Lead Command authority and management by establishing policy and 
guidance, Technical Order (TO) management, and requirement validation for spares, 
prioritization, and depot repairs (Sillence, 2020). The members of the A4M team provide 
the vision and direction for all AF CSE assets.  
The second organization in the triad is the 635th Supply Chain Operations Wing 
(SCOW). Responsible for parts management of fielded CSE, the SCOW coordinates 
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current assets’ sustainment through spare parts acquisition (Sillence, 2020). 
Redistribution Orders (RDO) leveling and transferring assets are also accomplished by 
the SCOW.  
The Air Force Program Executive Office Agile Combat Support (AFPEO/ACS) 
forms the third leg of the CSE triad (Sillence, 2020). The Support Equipment and 
Vehicles (SE&V) office under AFPEO/ACS provides CSE items with single-source 
management of TO accuracy, cybersecurity, and obsolescence prevention (Sillence, 
2020). Intended to maximize commonality and leverage efficiencies of scale, SE&V 
provides the acquisition and modernization oversight of all CSE items (Sillence, 2020). 
These three organizations refer to CSE modernization as the procurement of “new-new” 
assets and the acquisition of replacement items as “new-old” (Richards, 2020; Haralson, 
2020; Sillence, 2020; Swain, 2021). 
As the triad has addressed the field’s concerns in recent years, managers at all 
enterprise levels have been forced into obstacle cycles, preventing them from 
modernizing CSE and hampering the execution of flightline maintenance. Obstacle 
cycles, the focus of this research, are hurdles that exist in the process of modernization. 
These obstacles obscure the process, making a successful modernization project highly 
unlikely. A thorough review of the existing literature has revealed a gap in the 
conversation about AvSE—discussion about the obstacles to CSE modernization.  
To eliminate ambiguity, modernization must be defined for the purposes of this 
study. The acquisition community refers to Air Force Pamphlet (AFPAM) 63-128 for key 
definitions. The term most similar to the common use of modernization in AFPAM63-
128 is “modification,” defined as “a change to the form, fit, function, or interface of an 
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in-service…AF asset” (Department of the Air Force, 2014). The policy also defines 
modifications as activities that provide new capabilities, improve reliability, reduce cost, 
and enhance operational effectiveness. In this thesis, the term “modernization” is 
interchangeable with the AFPAM63-128 term “modification.” 
Based on interviews, site visits, and data provided by Subject Matter Experts 
(SMEs), this research will outline the critical obstacles to modernization, discuss the 
likely consequences of an outdated fleet of CSE, and provide recommendations to 
catalyze the modernization of CSE.  
Problem Statement 
Current policies and procedures have produced an outdated, unreliable CSE fleet 
with a funding disconnect of $2 billion (Haralson, 2020). Capability gaps exist that 
prevent the loading and employment of next-generation weapons (Sillence, 2020). The 
Air Force does not publish a consolidated list of the AvSE required to support its 
missions and is unable to produce hard metrics to articulate priorities, requirements, and 
capability gaps, relying instead on anecdotal evidence (Haralson, 2020). The maintenance 
“no-fail” mentality has masked deep problems in the current equipment fleet, obscuring a 
clear view of the actual situation (Bobic, 2018). Communication about AvSE needs is so 
ineffective that the Air Force paid a contractor to facilitate a consolidated priority list 
between an owning MAJCOM and front-line maintainers (Layne, 2020). These problems 
do not exist due to a lack of commitment by managers and maintainers, but due to policy 
requirements that force change-agents into endless cycles, only to be met by an obstacle 
that prevents modernization.  
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Purpose Statement 
The purpose and primary goal of this analysis is to identify and explore the 
obstacles to modernization faced by SMEs in the CSE logistics enterprise through 
interviews and data collection. The resulting analysis will recommend policy and funding 
changes to remedy shortfalls in Common Support Equipment modernization objectives.   
Research Questions 
RQ 1: What are the top five obstacles to Common Support Equipment modernization? 
RQ 2: What are the consequences to the Air Force mission and objectives due to those 
obstacles? 
RQ 3: What actions should Air Force policy-makers take to address those obstacles? 
Research Focus 
A review of the current National and Air Force priorities will provide context to 
logistics and acquisition professionals’ operating environment. The literature review of 
Air Force Support Equipment instruction and policy will provide the written bounds of 
the management triad. Previous AvSE research is then explored to ensure a thorough 
review of the topic. Subsequently, the methodological tools and data collection process of 
this analysis are described. The paper concludes with research findings, limitations, and 
areas for future research.  
Methodology 
This research was accomplished using qualitative interviews and the collection of 
current Air Force documents and other materials. The qualitative approach employed was 
influenced by the framework described in the books: Research Design: Qualitative, 
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Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches and Practical Research: Planning and 
Design (Creswell, 2014; Leedy & Ormrod, 2015).  
Assumptions 
This thesis assumes that each interviewed AvSE manager described the 
enterprise’s actual state and that the described events, numbers, and details represent an 
accurate perspective. The analysis is founded upon a lack of personal agenda on the part 
of the interviewees. Additionally, it is assumed that outdated AvSE directly affects a 
unit’s ability to deploy and effectively execute its tasked mission, based on the 
conclusions of previous authors (Barrett, 2015; Bayer, 2003; Bobic, 2018; Leighton, 
2017; O'Donnell & Forster, 1975; Williams, 1991). Finally, the proliferation of peculiar 
equipment and supplies is assumed to increase cost, based on prior research (Leighton, 
2017; Casey, 2018). 
Limitations 
The scope of this research is focused on the modernization of Common Support 
Equipment, with no discussion of the modernization or acquisition of Automatic Test 
Sets. The acquisition process for current assets, or “new-old,” is not considered. Rather 
than focus on how the enterprise procures replacement CSE, this thesis explores the 
procurement of “new-new” equipment. There is no discussion of equipment data 
collection or interpretation as other projects have already recommended increased data 
with current contracts in place to address that gap. Finally, this research has no intention 
of quantitatively proving CSE’s importance to the Air Force mission.  
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter shapes the context surrounding the operating environment of the 
support equipment management enterprise. To build the foundation of the modernization 
milieu, national and departmental policy will be summarized and discussed. The relevant 
governing regulations will also be outlined, providing the major actors’ roles and 
responsibilities and specific relevant definitions. This chapter will conclude with a survey 
of AvSE research.  
National and Departmental Policy 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America provides 
the strategic vision for the Executive Branch of government (Trump, 2017). Until the 
President publishes a new NSS, every branch’s policy should subordinate to this vision, 
working towards a practical execution of the national priorities. Acknowledging the 
changing geopolitical landscape, the 2017 NSS describes the critical threat to American 
hegemony: the rise of China and Russia as peer adversaries. To meet these threats, the 
President named modernization his top priority for action by the Department of Defense 
(DoD).  
Modernization efforts for the United States military should be undertaken with the 
goal of retaining overmatch: the ability to defeat any adversary in any situation (Trump, 
2017). The military’s advantages should be clearly understood by potential adversaries, 
with modernization focused on exploiting additional capabilities. Not to be singularly 
focused on hardware, the DoD is directed to eradicate administrative obstacles to 
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modernization—receptive to readily-available commercial technologies and practices. 
The NSS expects the DoD to rapidly test, benchmark, and deploy cutting edge 
capabilities.  
The President named acquisition reform as the second military priority. Echoing 
the modernization directive, the NSS expects the DoD to reduce cost through innovative 
non-traditional technology sources (Trump, 2017). The policy directs a refreshed focus 
on maintenance and logistics, recognizing the vital role these functions play in the 
national ability to rapidly deploy with a resilient, agile force.  
The National Defense Strategy (NDS), signed by the Secretary of Defense, 
provides DoD-specificity to the President’s NSS. Published in 2018, Secretary Mattis’ 
NDS acknowledges, “we cannot expect success fighting tomorrow’s conflicts with 
yesterday’s weapons or equipment” (Mattis, 2018). To rebuild the lethality of the 
American fighting force, key capabilities must be modernized.  
The ability to employ forces in smaller pockets throughout the world, prioritized 
by the NSS, is reemphasized in detail. The NDS guides the military away from a 
traditional deployment of large, consolidated, uncontested infrastructure towards a 
dispersion of assets. Decentralization of assets necessitates the prioritization of mobility 
capability and prepositioned employment equipment. The NDS describes the force of the 
future as one with a light logistical footprint with fluid adaptation to an unrelenting, 
capable threat.  
The current Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Charles Brown Jr., published 
Accelerate Change or Lose in August 2020. He asserted the Air Force must adapt to new 
technologies and changing environments—challenging the status quo of current 
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operations (Brown, 2020). Action Order D of General Brown’s directive calls for Airmen 
to “identify systems and programs that are outdated…to make way for capabilities that 
will make us competitive in the future high-end fight” (Brown, 2020).  This directive is 
clear: the force must modernize.  
The policy directives of both the NSS and the NDS prompted the Commanders of 
the Air Force’s Major Commands (MAJCOMS) to codify the Air Force’s modernization 
objectives (AMC/CD, et al., 2019). Paragraph 3, Item t. directs Air Force Materiel 
Command (AFMC), in conjunction with affiliated MAJCOMs, to “prototype, acquire and 
deploy experimental equipment,” including Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) as a 
subset of CSE. In support of this effort, current AGE capabilities must be evaluated in 
both form and function to determine employment efficacy.  
The modernization of CSE directly supports the Air Force’s modernization 
priorities, the Secretary of Defense, and the President of the United States. Without 
parallel modernization efforts throughout the force, the United States military has no 
assurance of victory in a peer-level conflict.  
Governing Regulation 
The next subsection will summarize the governing regulation of CSE to provide 
the bounds of acquisition and procurement. AFI63-101/20-101 provides the backbone 
policies and procedures for acquiring all items intended to satisfy the warfighter’s 
requirements (Department of the Air Force, 2020). Program Managers (PM) hold the 
ultimate responsibility for their respective acquisition programs and use AFI63-101/20-
101 as their operating manual. To “provide efficiency and reduce cost,” the AFI prefers 
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the employment of standardized support equipment or CSE. The PM should minimize the 
proliferation of equipment unique to a single system, subjected to that particular system’s 
employment requirements.  
Paragraph 7.17.1 specifically directs the PM to acquire, “to the greatest extent 
possible,” support equipment that is common with other systems, service branches, and 
programs (Department of the Air Force, 2020). After careful consideration of all systems 
currently available in the Air Force inventory, if a PM determines that CSE assets do not 
meet the needs of a program, a waiver to acquire PSE is required. Waivers must be 
submitted to the Support Equipment Product Group.  
If a PM is unable to satisfy the program’s requirements through CSE, the Support 
Equipment Recommendations Data process through AFMC is initiated as the last 
alternative (Department of the Air Force, 2020). In summary, AFI63-101/20-101 
provides clear, unequivocal guidance for Program Managers to maximize the use of CSE 
during the acquisition of any new program.  
Relevant Research 
Multiple studies have documented CSE’s importance over the last 45 years 
(O’Donnell & Forster, 1975; Nauta & Ward, 1985; Williams, 1991; Leighton, 2017; 
Bobic, 2018; Casey, 2018). Each has examined a different aspect of the CSE enterprise, 
including acquisition, management, and employment. O’Donnell and Forster (1975), 
commissioned by the Logistics Management Institute, investigated AGE’s acquisition 
process. The researchers employed a series of case studies to determine the current 
11 
acquisition process’s ability to meet the needs of the warfighter through AGE 
procurement.  
O’Donnell and Forster (1975) selected ten defense systems for analysis, with 76 
specific items identified as case study subjects. From the case study subjects, 17 
problems were classified with 20 causes. Though the authors determined that the 
acquisition process provided a sufficient system for acquiring support equipment, the 
process proved ineffective for complex electronic test.  
Of the key recommendations, three are especially relevant to the current research 
topic. The first is the finding that the MIL-HDBK-300D, the central registry for support 
equipment employed by the DoD, was ruefully incomplete. Of the selected case study 
items, 73% were not included in the MIL-HDBK-300D, and 100% of observed electronic 
test equipment was not included (O'Donnell & Forster, 1975). The Air Force did not 
address the issue, and Chapter IV discusses how a lack of CSE documentation provides 
an obstacle to modernization.  
O’Donnell & Forster (1975) also identified the Aerospace Ground Equipment 
Recommendations Data (AGERD) process, a precursor to the current Support Equipment 
Recommendations Data (SERD) process, as a reform candidate. The authors found that 
20% of selected case studies did not use the AGERD, and governing policies did not 
effectively mandate the use of the process. Additionally, the authors observed that the 
average processing time for an AGERD was 200% of the allotted amount, providing 
further evidence for program reform. The lengthy, ineffective AGERD process 
transformed into the equally toothless SERD, and resulted in the current proliferation of 
PSE.  
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Finally, the study recommended creating a central governing body for the 
acquisition and management of support equipment. This office would facilitate 
communication between System Program Offices (SPO), store feedback data about 
purchased systems, and ensure the proper execution of a rigorous SERD process 
(O'Donnell & Forster, 1975). Though the authors recommended these changes 46 years 
ago, the same obstacles plague AvSE management today.  
Nauta and Ward (1985), also commissioned by the Logistics Management 
Institute, focused on test equipment management policies. Though a slightly different 
resource than CSE, test equipment management overlaps significantly with CSE 
(Haralson, 2020). The study recommended changes to the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Manpower, Installations, and Logistics to address the low reliability, usability, and 
functionality of test equipment reported by end-users (Nauta & Ward, 1985).  
The first change recommended by Nauta & Ward supported O’Donnell & 
Forster’s 1975 recommendation for a revised central registry of all employed AvSE. The 
central registry would serve as a “DoD-wide preferred items list,” providing a single 
reference point for PMs during the acquisition process and reducing the proliferation of 
unique items (Nauta & Ward, 1985). Additionally, the study recommends the 
standardization of test equipment data reporting, providing real-time capability and 
shortfall data. Finally, Nauta & Ward recommended a new instruction providing 
standardized guidance and administration of test equipment.  
The authors concluded that many of the ongoing field-level employment 
challenges of test equipment could be mitigated by management changes. Many of the 
same recommendations from 1975 and 1985, including comprehensive documentation, 
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central management, data reporting, and written policy, are echoed by AvSE managers 
today.  
An AFIT student, Bradie Williams (1991), examined the acquisition process of 
support equipment. He found that the Air Force has traded the necessary support 
equipment for additional airframes during major acquisition buys. As a result, while the 
larger fleet may be attractive on paper, the actual capability is much smaller due to a lack 
of required equipment. In other words, the Air Force shortsightedly eliminates expensive 
support equipment in favor of a few more aircraft, hamstringing maintenance efforts 
before the new weapon becomes operational.  
Williams (1991) also concluded that the fluid political nature of acquisition 
management leads PM’s to make decisions that are not in the best interest of the 
warfighter. The amount of money involved in the development and fielding of a new 
airframe is inherently political, leading acquisition professionals to take actions that run 
counter to their actual goals of producing lethal, cutting edge systems (Williams, 1991).  
Compounding the unstable nature of the American political system’s influence on 
the acquisition process, Williams points to Puckett’s Law as another variability source 
(1991). Puckett’s Law states that given the constants of cost, weight, and reliability, a 
system’s capability can be expected to advance by a factor of two each year. During the 
complicated and lengthy process of weapon system design, the changing nature of the 
technology itself causes an endless possibility of updates and changes. Each time the 
technology mutates, support equipment redesign may be necessary. Often, this results in 
support equipment design late in the acquisition process, forced to “play a game of catch-
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up and…never quite succeeding” (Williams, 1991). These updates are expensive, and the 
end product likely has not caught up with the final capabilities of the weapon system. 
Furthermore, Williams’ thesis identified the ever-increasing bureaucratic and cost 
processes as root causes of acquisition obstacles. He made the poignant prediction: “if the 
trend continues…by the year 2000…not a single weapon system [will be] procured. Total 
control results in total immobility” (Williams, 1991). He found that the support 
equipment acquisition process’s failings are representative of the greater DoD system and 
often results in unreliable, late-to-need, incomplete, and wastefully expensive programs. 
He concluded by asserting that only expert adherence to the acquisition process could 
produce the desired end-state of fully-supported weapons systems. 
Another AFIT student, Captain Michael Bayer (2003), conducted a study 
investigating the impact of AGE management concepts, quantity available, and aircraft 
numbers on a unit’s ability to maximize sortie production. Conducted during the 
transition towards “right-sized” Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) Unit Type Code (UTC) 
packages, he validated a methodology for calculating the impact of AGE assets on a 
flightline.  
The project utilized Scalable Integration Model for Objective Resource Capacity 
Evaluations (SIMFORCE) to simulate sortie production capabilities. Focused on seven 
pieces of CSE, Capt Bayer explored two methods of homestation AGE management—
pooled centrally and allocated by unit. Central management resulted in a single pool of 
resources shared by the local flying units; allocated management dedicated specific 
pieces of equipment to each unit. By adjusting the number of aircraft deployed in his 
simulations, he quantified the impact of AGE resources available to each flying unit. He 
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concluded that the management style of AGE while operating under the AEF concept 
impacts sortie generation (Bayer, 2003). This paper, one of the first attempts to quantify 
the importance of AvSE on the Air Force mission, provided strong evidence that different 
management techniques produce different levels of mission generation.  
Another research paper, written by Lieutenant Colonel Shane Barrett (2015), 
discussed the role of high-demand, low-density support equipment in contingency 
planning. His paper details the history of support equipment from the Wright Brothers in 
1909 through the development of the F-35. Lt Col Barrett reviews the influence of the 
Cold War on the Air Force mission and structure, noting the careful planning of SE 
numbers and location. To ensure victory against an attack by the Soviet Union, the Air 
Force recognized the need for proper logistical support (Barrett, 2015).  
However, the fall of the Soviet Union initiated a significant drawdown of the Air 
Force, both in size and budget (Barrett, 2015). The posture of support equipment 
resources was reduced significantly, no longer needed by the leaner fleet of active-duty 
aircraft. Since the cuts of the 1990s, the Air Force has developed a dependency upon 
contract logistics support (CLS) to provision SE for new airframe acquisitions. 
Subservient to CLS resources, legacy CSE does not benefit from modernization efforts, 
collapsing under the continued pressure to execute the mission. As a result, SE fleets are 
more specialized, less agile, and less available (Barrett, 2015).  
To counter the decline of CSE, Lt Col Barrett argues that cuts to SE funding must 
be considered carefully. Higher priority must be given to SE sustainment, necessitating a 
paradigm shift by the planning community. SE availability is no longer guaranteed, and 
must not be treated by planners as a readily-available asset. His paper provides insight 
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into the changes to the Air Force mission since the dawn of military aviation, and outlines 
the recent problems caused by CSE funding cuts.  
Capt Jason Leighton focused his AFIT thesis on the impact of CSE on Aircraft 
Availability (AA) (2017). He argued that the maintenance community struggles to adjust 
CSE authorizations or justify resource requirements due to a lack of quantifiable impact 
on AA. Recognizing the fleet’s aging nature, coupled with reduced reliability, Capt 
Leighton blames the FY13 CSE funding deficit of $1.24 billion on the inability to draw a 
direct link between the equipment and AA (Leighton, 2017). Through a case study 
methodology observing six F-16 bases, the author examined two flying metrics, the 
flying schedule, and support equipment levels and authorizations, among other selected 
indicators.  
After collecting the data, the author performed a quantitative analysis to 
determine the specific link between CSE and AA. Of note, the study initially focused on 
six pieces of equipment, three of which were AGE and three of which were Automatic 
Test Systems (ATS). However, due to a lack of availability of Integrated Maintenance 
Data System (IMDS) data, only the ATS items were studied: Environmental Control 
System Test Set (ECS Tester), Joint Services Electronic Combat Systems Tester (JSECT 
Tester), and TTU-205 Pressure-Temperature Tester (205 Tester).  
During his data collection, Capt Leighton noted the difficulty he experienced 
gathering equipment data. The author used Precision Measurement Equipment 
Laboratory (PMEL) Automated Management System (PAMS) records to calculate the 
three selected pieces of test equipment’s availability—a lengthy, labor-intensive process. 
The need for a consolidated equipment data system was a key finding of his study. The 
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results of his quantitative analysis failed to show any direct link between CSE and AA; 
however, his qualitative analysis presented strong evidence of a link.  
During his interviews, respondents indicated a strong motivation to execute the 
flying mission, overcoming equipment shortfalls through methods not captured in the 
available data. As a result, the other key finding of Capt Leighton’s study was that the 
maintenance community consistently overcame equipment shortfalls to execute the 
mission—inadvertently masking the true state of the equipment and its impact on the 
mission. Further obscuring the data, all six units pieced components together from 
unserviceable units to make serviceable sets (a practice known as Frankensteining) while 
carrying aircraft Partially Mission Capable (PMC). Because PMC aircraft do not impact a 
unit’s AA rate, the study could not conclude that the three selected pieces of equipment 
directly impacted a unit’s ability to execute the flying mission during FY16 (Leighton, 
2017). However, through Capt Leighton’s attempt to validate Capt Bayer’s (2003) 
qualitative link between AvSE and mission capability, he highlighted the need for better 
data management and provided the foundation for another AFIT thesis.  
MSgt Benjamin Bobic (2018) explored Capt Leighton’s claim that maintenance 
culture obscured the true state of the AvSE fleet, coining the term “Flightline Heroics.” 
Seeking to quantify the impact of Frankensteining, MSgt Bobic studied the impact on a 
technician’s time and metric availability to recommend additional metrics for tracking. 
His research focused on the same three pieces of CSE ATS as Capt Leighton (JSECT, 
ECS, TTU205) and employed a case study methodology to explore technician impact 
(Bobic, 2018).  
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The author requested the six test bases submit spreadsheets documenting 
equipment sign-out, time-in-use, and corrective action times to collect data. Due to low 
participation rates, a small time-window, and minimal available data, the study could not 
quantify the impact of CSE on a technician’s time. The study concluded with two 
recommendations: increased CSE metrics tracking and more proactive CSE management 
(Bobic, 2018). Though Bobic’s methodology was unable to support a direct quantitative 
link between AvSE and mission generation, his work was the third attempt to validate the 
relationship.  
Summary 
This chapter opened with a summary of the current national and Air Force 
priorities, establishing the need to present a modern, flexible force to peer-level 
adversaries. Applicable Air Force Instructions then provided the policy directives urging 
the acquisition of common, cost-effective support equipment. Studies from 1975 and 
1985 insisted the Air Force AvSE fleet was headed for failure, calling for comprehensive 
documentation, central management, data reporting, and written policy. Papers from 1991 
and 2015 described an acquisition process that overlooks AvSE, leading to large fleets of 
aircraft struggling to meet their intended levels of readiness due to insufficient 
equipment. Three authors, in 2003, 2017 and 2018, attempted to quantitatively link AvSE 
health to mission generation, and provided some evidence for that link. The review of the 
AvSE research over the last 45 years highlighted both the vital role of Air Force support 





The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the methodology selected to analyze the 
obstacles to CSE modernization. The section will begin with a discussion of the research 
scope, followed by an introduction of the two texts used to guide the research design. The 
chapter then covers the processes of data collection and data analysis, and concludes by 
explaining the steps taken to ensure the validity and reliability of the data.  
Research Scope 
The overview of CSE literature in Chapter II provided sources demonstrating the 
vital role CSE plays in the mission of the Air Force. Without reliable CSE in sufficient 
numbers, the process of aircraft regeneration grinds to a halt. This research builds upon 
that foundation which establishes the vital role of CSE, and seeks to enumerate specific 
obstacles to modernization in support of General Brown’s Action Order D. Additionally, 
this research focuses on CSE modernization, without focusing on the routine AvSE 
management tasks. The obstacles explored by the research questions hinder efforts to 
modernize through the procurement of “new-new” CSE, as discussed in Chapter I.  
Methodology—A Qualitative Analysis  
The methodological approach employed was primarily informed by two texts: 
Research Design by John Creswell and Practical Research by Paul Leedy and Jeanne 
Ellis Ormrod. Due to the complexity of the CSE modernization process, a qualitative 
approach was selected. With no previous attempts to model the problem and only a rough 
idea of the obstacles, a qualitative study best aligned with the texts’ recommendations. 
20 
Comprised of many dimensions and layers, this study focuses on what needs to be 
explored by Air Force leaders to effect modernization.  
To the greatest extent possible, the research was performed in the natural setting 
of CSE modernization, in the offices, conference calls, and visits to the organizations 
responsible (Creswell, 2014). However, due to COVID-19, most interviews had to be 
conducted over the phone. The researcher was the key instrument of data collection; 
questionnaires were not used (Creswell, 2014). Data were collected from as many sources 
as possible, including interviews, documents, training materials, and electronic 
presentations (Creswell, 2014; Leedy & Ormrod, 2015).  
The constant comparative method was employed at all stages of the research 
process. This method, an iterative process moving between data collection and data 
analysis, allowed the researcher to refine and scope the inquiry through the course of the 
project (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). An inductive and deductive data analysis process was 
employed, working back and forth through collected data to classify themes, determining 
if other data fit into those themes while identifying areas where more data collection were 
required (Creswell, 2014). Though this process cannot identify cause-and-effect 
relationships, the themes identified provide areas of focus to leaders desiring change 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). 
Finally, a qualitative study was chosen to take advantage of three strengths 
identified by Leedy & Ormrod: multifaced description, verification, and problem 
identification (2015). Through a multifaced description, the complex nature of CSE 
modernization was explored. Verification was used to test the validity of the sponsor’s 
claim that significant obstacles impede modernization. Finally, through the process of 
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problem identification, this work intends to inform Air Force leadership about the 
changes required to modernize one of the Service’s most important assets.  
After selecting a qualitative approach, a grounded theory research design best met 
the needs of the research questions. The grounded theory approach starts with the data 
available and builds a theory based on that data (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). In this case, 
large amounts of data were available, and no other research had formed a theory about 
CSE modernization obstacles. 
Due to the flexibility offered by the grounded theory approach, techniques were 
borrowed from the ethnography and phenomenological study methodologies. 
Ethnographies study entire groups, including their cultures, interactions, beliefs, and 
processes (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). This study was focused on the interactions between 
members of the organizations responsible for modernization, though not culturally or 
anthropologically. Because modernization requires repeated interactions between 
different organizations, key informants, and participant observation provided insight into 
modernization processes. Participant observation allowed the researcher to witness 
recurring meetings and interactions, while key informants within the community 
provided clarification and context to the observations (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). 
Phenomenological study techniques were also utilized—observing people’s 
perceptions of a situation. Seeking to understand how people feel about modernization, 
mostly unstructured, lengthy interviews utilized a few, carefully selected set of 
participants, all with direct experience of the modernization process and its sophistication 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). Participants were selected based on the recommendations of 
the sponsor, and triangulated with the recommendations of two other key informants. 
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Most organizations included interviews with both military leadership and civilian 
managers. 
Based on grounded theory development and augmented by techniques from 
ethnographical and phenomenological approaches, the constant comparative method was 
applied to build a compelling picture of the obstacles faced by those responsible for CSE 
modernization in the Air Force.   
Data Collection 
The primary method of data collection employed was the use of interviews and 
informed by the aforementioned texts. Each interview started with the same three 
questions, with the rest of the conversation mostly unstructured.  
Experts were selected based on current or recent experience with CSE 
modernization, including headquarters policy and management, finance, acquisition, 
lifecycle management, research, and employment, as well as one member of the Air 
National Guard. During this thesis, the names of the individuals interviewed will not be 
disclosed. Certain documents will be credited to their authors, with prior permission. 
Most data were kept confidential to minimize the risk of reprisal and encourage 
transparency.  
As necessitated by the approach described in Leedy and Ormrod (2015), the data 
collection of documents, presentations, slides, and training materials all contain the 
perspectives of the members of the group. Additionally, only data that was accurate and 
consistent with the research questions were included, ensuring validity. All data were 
evaluated for consistency with the patterns revealed to maintain reliability.  
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Triangulation was also employed to validate the consistency and credibility of 
data (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). This approach collects multiple forms of data from 
multiple sources. The data were also collected over a 1-year period, from January of 2020 
through January of 2021, and included multiple visits, trips, phone conversations, emails, 
and observations. A discriminant sampling of SMEs built a thorough picture of the 
obstacles to modernization (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). Due to the presence of a power 
hierarchy, samples of data were taken from multiple points within the organization 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). By sampling diverse contexts and situations, triangulation was 
utilized to validate the consistency and credibility of observations and interview findings. 
Finally, consensus was sought by providing the study results to the sponsor before 
completion for clarification and review.  
The use of a rigorous process of long-term, consistent data collection, utilizing 
established techniques developed by leading research-design experts ensured the validity 
and the reliability of the data collection process. 
Data Analysis  
 The data analysis process was also informed by the two Creswell, Leedy, and 
Ormrod texts, primarily executed through the constant comparative method. Additionally, 
Creswell’s data analysis spiral was utilized in an iterative process. The spiral starts with 
(1) the organization of data, followed by (2) a review of the data for pattern identification 
and exploration, then the (3) identification of themes and categories in the data, 
concluding with (4) the summarization of the interpretation of the data (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2015). 
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After an interview was completed, the conversation notes were transcribed into a 
document and then coded based on patterns in the responses. The responses were then 
categorized by subject and organized by topic. After five interviews, a start list of 
categories was used, with five themes selected as critical obstacles to modernization 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). As patterns in the coded responses were identified, they 
pointed towards a natural progression of events, further clarifying the obstacles (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2015). Outliers, exceptions, and contradictions were also noted. Finally, the 
coded data were converted into cycles of obstacles and interpreted through flowcharts 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2015).  
As with any qualitative study, the author considered the potential biases he 
brought to the analysis. As an Air Force officer, some of the interview responses may 
have been affected due to a perceived rank or power gap. To overcome this barrier, 
before each interview, the academic nature of the research was clarified and the 
respondent was assured of complete confidentiality.  
Another potential bias stemmed from the author’s primary professional 
experience as an Aircraft Maintenance Officer. Reflexivity, a researcher’s influence on 
the outcome of a study due to background, must be addressed to ensure the validity and 
reliability of the findings (Creswell, 2014). Experience with CSE on the flightline, 
backshop, and deployed all formed a context that had to be considered. To overcome this 
potential bias, only the words and ideas of the interviewees were used as data sources.  
Finally, the research sponsor also provided a source of bias. As a significant data 
source, the sponsor coordinated many of the initial interviews and is highly motivated to 
uncover and address obstacles to the modernization process. To address this bias, the 
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sponsor’s data was triangulated with other data sources to ensure validity and reliability 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2015).   
Summary 
This chapter discussed the scope of the research, focusing on the obstacles to CSE 
modernization and relying on the work of other scholars to establish the gravity of the 
need to maintain a reliable fleet. The chapter also discussed the chosen qualitative 
methodology, primarily informed by two texts by Creswell, Leedy, and Ormrod. 
Employing techniques from grounded theory studies, data validity and reliability were 
ensured through triangulation and the constant comparative method. Finally, the data was 
coded and organized by theme, and analyzed with the potential biases of the author and 




IV. Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
The previous chapters established the urgent need for the Air Force to modernize 
the current CSE fleet, detailing examples of waste, reviewing national and Air Force 
policy, and summarizing significant CSE works over the last 45 years. Chapter III 
explained the methodological rigor applied to this research, and Chapter IV will provide 
the analysis of those results. This chapter is organized into three sections, one for each 
research question. As discussed in Chapter III, these results are the expressed opinions of 
interviewed Subject Matter Experts, and names have been withheld to protect the 
integrity of the work and their responses.  
Analysis and Results 
RQ 1: What are the top five obstacles to Common Support Equipment modernization? 
The five themes that SME’s expressed as obstacles to CSE modernization were 
Inadequate Resources, Administrative Structure, Acquisition Management, 
Communication Breakdowns, and Competing Cultures. The five obstacles identified by 
the interviewed experts each contribute to failed efforts to modernize.   
Inadequate Resources 
The first obstacle to CSE modernization identified through the data collection 
process was a lack of resources; both funding and manpower. The current state of CSE 
sustainment, or the management and purchase of “new-old” equipment, is dire. Managers 
responsible for the life cycle management of the support equipment fleet estimate a $2 
billion disconnect between current funding and sustainment needs. Triad members 
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estimate $150 million is needed annually to prevent on-hand assets from critically 
degrading below 75% of authorization levels. To bring current assets back to approved 
authorizations, $250 million to $300 million would be needed annually for the next 15 
years.  
To understand the context and current state of neglect, an overview of AvSE 
funding history is necessary. Before 2004, all sustainment of AvSE was funded through 
investment funds 3010 BP12 and 3080 BP84 and was highly centralized as part of the 
cumbersome Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) process. The funding process was 
slow and inflexible due to significant documentation and justification required by the 
Corporate Structure. In a move to accelerate the AvSE acquisition process and better 
align purchases with warfighter needs, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed a 
complete program overhaul. 
Significant change took place in 2004, during the Air Force mission-pivot from 
near-peer adversaries to counter-insurgency warfare. Congress approved an investment 
budget threshold increase to $250 thousand, recategorizing 96% of the AvSE portfolio to 
Operations & Maintenance (O&M) funding. This transfer, referred to as the Support 
Equipment Transformation (SET), fundamentally altered AvSE funding and management 
and produced second and third-order effects that the managers of the day did not expect.  
The equipment below the $250 thousand threshold was no longer managed 
centrally, but placed the sustainment responsibility with the individual MAJCOMs. The 
new process would empower MAJCOMs to prioritize AvSE needs, assuming 
responsibility for all planning, programming, and budgeting. This change was intended to 
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streamline the budgeting process, provide flexibility during the year of execution, and 
reduce the time to procure new equipment.  
SET managers recognized the importance of retaining commonality, 
interoperability, and standardization through centralized procurement, consolidation of 
purchases, and economies of scale. However, the practical management of AvSE, 
including its procurement, would remain under the Air Logistics Centers (ALC), 
members of AFMC. Longer-term contracts would be managed by the ALCs and funded 
by the MAJCOMs, based on the MAJCOM’s priorities. For example, an upgrade to an F-
15E AvSE item would require Air Combat Command (ACC) to coordinate with AFMC 
and use ACC funds. This new process reduced the funding burden, but increased the 
communication required to coordinate priorities and funding.  
SET clarified management responsibilities for Peculiar Support Equipment (PSE), 
giving individual MAJCOMs the ability to move unilaterally to implement equipment 
changes. However, SET obscured CSE management lines, leaving multiple organizations 
responsible for sustainment, with no clear funding source.  
Between 2004 and 2007, the expensive Global War on Terror forced the Air 
Force to choose which programs would be underfunded. Unclear lines of responsibility 
for AvSE were clarified through Centralized Asset Management (CAM) in 2007, re-
establishing a central authority to make changes to CSE with a unit cost of less than $250 
thousand. Reverting to vertical management of CSE, CAM was intended to streamline 
budget programming and allocation processes that the MAJCOMs had operated for the 
previous three years. However, by lumping all AvSE back under one organization, the 
standup of CAM caused budgeting for specific CSE items to lapse because funding lines 
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for individual items were lumped together under an organization without a significant 
annual budget.  
AFMC was established as the lead MAJCOM for CSE, but without access to 
O&M funds, could not make large financial commitments without first enlisting support 
from other MAJCOMs. One-year O&M funds, primarily at the disposal of the 
MAJCOMs, were too unpredictable to provide the necessary forecasting and strategy for 
CSE. To make matters more complicated, a change to a CSE asset required coordination 
between multiple MAJCOMs, without AFMC managers possessing any lead command 
authority.  
Access to funding was not wholly cut off, however. AFMC could advocate for 
investment funding through the Pentagon’s Air Force Logistics (Log) Panel. Responsible 
for multiple logistics priorities, the Log Panel has not frequently prioritized AvSE 
modernization, as AvSE makes up only 6% of the entire logistics portfolio. 
The Log Panel’s long list of competing priorities to AFMC’s CAM portfolio 
made it easy to divert money away from CSE management, and resulted in a significant 
annual funding decline from 2007 until 2016. The remaining budget, unable to cover the 
necessary replacement of fielded items, led to multiple partial programs, gaps in on-hand 
asset levels versus authorizations, and threatened the Air Force’s ability to meet 
published OPLAN requirements. Critical CSE assets, including flightline generators and 
munitions loaders, currently have on-hand levels below the 75% authorization line.  
As a result of enterprise CSE managers’ growing concerns, the Air Force changed 
CSE funding back to investment dollars in 2016. However, asset levels are so critical that 
operational units must maintain exhausted equipment for cannibalization of parts. Unit 
30 
possession of these dilapidated assets paints an inaccurate picture of the health of the 
CSE fleet, allowing funding to go to other priorities due to a lack of data.  
The twelve-year period without investment dollars has resulted in a CSE fleet that 
cannot be fixed in a single year of FYDP planning, but must be treated as a long-term 
priority. Current managers, responsible for the sustainment and purchase of “new-old” 
assets, must make tough decisions, funding only a small number of the highest priority 
projects each year. Without the necessary funds to fill existing CSE backorders, AFMC 
managers had no funding remaining for modernization efforts. 
To pursue CSE modernization projects, AFMC requires access to 3600 
investment funds. AFPAM63-128, the policy governing life cycle management, allows 
the modernization of a system through investment funds: “Modifications can occur 
throughout the life of a system. …changes made to maintain the existing capability are 
funded via the O&M appropriation while changes made to improve or upgrade the 
system are funded with investment appropriations” (Department of the Air Force, 2014).  
Until FY18, dedicated CSE investment funding was nonexistent. Current 
procedure forces AFMC modernization projects to compete with other priorities through 
the Air Force Corporate Structure. The SET and CAM policies have decimated the CSE 
budget, requiring all available financial resources to be dedicated to sustaining a depleted 
fleet. 
The second resource preventing CSE modernization is manpower. The three 
management triad members, discussed in Chapter I, are not adequately manned to 
manage CSE through the product lifecycle. Presently, modernization is not an automated 
process. Each of the 53,000 unique stock numbers is managed by a small team of people, 
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with little to no augmentation by automated processes. Any modernization initiative 
requires manpower to study existing capability, justify recommended changes, inform the 
acquisition process, and manage initial fielding. While the 635 SCOW manages the basic 
redistribution of assets based on asset levels and vacancies, it does not track fleet health. 
Unable to manage both “new-old” and “new-new” projects with current manning levels, 
CSE triad organizations spend their time addressing only the most urgent priorities.  
Inadequate resources, the first obstacle to CSE modernization, have resulted in a 
poorly sustained fleet of equipment. Both SET and CAM, policy initiatives designed to 
streamline funding and management of SE, have been inadequate vehicles for effective 
sustainment of CSE. As a result of low-priority budget allocations over fifteen years, the 
CSE management triad is tasked with preventing mission failure with an expended fleet 
of equipment from the 1960s and 70s. Without the manpower resources to manage both 
the current fleet and plan for the fleet of the future, CSE modernization projects are often 
dead-on-arrival.  
Administrative Structure 
The second obstacle to modernization identified through SME interviews is the 
current administrative structure of CSE assets, and broken into three themes: a lack of 
strategic vision and authority, enterprise management of AvSE, and data management. 
Each of the three themes points to a different aspect of modernization failure in the 
management structure.  
When SET assigned PSE to individual SPOs, and CAM consolidated CSE under 
AFMC, AvSE was left with no unifying, strategic vision or authority. In practice, each 
office followed a different process for modernization. The SPOs focused only on their 
32 
assigned weapon system, initiatives like AFWERX and Spark Tank focused on grassroots 
projects, and no organization had a formal process or authority to coordinate these 
efforts. Even the definition of “modernization” is not consistent, with no sole policy 
governing the CSE portfolio. Though AFMC is the designated lead MAJCOM for CSE, 
no Executive Agent has been designated as a full-spectrum Program Office (PO) with the 
commensurate authority.  
This authority vacuum enables outsized individual MAJCOM influence on the 
modernization process. Because AFMC does not control the purse strings, other 
MAJCOMs do not necessarily follow lead command policy, as their readiness is based on 
their operations requirements, outlined in documents like AFI10-201 and AFI10-601, 
subject to AFPD10-9. Chapter II discussed the SERD process and highlighted the 
process’s lack of authority to force the unification of modernization efforts. Thus, without 
fiscal or managerial authority, AFMC must integrate the requirements of eight other 
MAJCOMs when tackling a CSE modernization project. Even when a project is in the 
enterprise’s best interest, a single MAJCOM can hijack the process, blocking the linkage 
of requirements and condemning the project to failure.  
The second theme pointing to the current administrative structure as an obstacle to 
CSE modernization is a lack of enterprise-level management of AvSE. A result of SET, 
multiple links exist between the Pentagon and organizations responsible for AvSE 
management. SPOs, under the influence of their lead MAJCOM, often modernize the 
PSE assigned to their programs, but that money is spent in silos, with no consideration of 
similar projects in the enterprise. The SERD process requires a cursory look at existing 
CSE but merely recommends consolidation and does not include a requirement to 
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consider existing PSE. Each SPO develops specifications based only on their own 
requirements with no analysis of further applicability. No one asks, “If we spend 10% 
more, could this be useful on another platform?” Triad members are often not included in 
ongoing PSE modernization projects and have no vehicle to leverage procedural change 
to benefit the larger fleet. Finally, because the triad works for AFMC/A4, they are often 
unaware of the larger acquisition picture available to SAF/AQ, leaving the very 
organizations responsible for CSE modernization out of the development process.  
This lack of coordination results in an ambiguous process, short-circuiting fresh 
thought, and producing ambiguous requirements. AFMC estimates that a minimum of 50 
to 100 duplicative pieces of equipment are currently fielded because SPOs do not usually 
coordinate modernization projects or requirements.  
The third theme to emerge as a result of a faulty administrative structure was data 
management. Chapter II cited multiple studies that called for improved AvSE data 
management, but primary documents like the MIL-HDBK-300 have since been 
discontinued. The old system designed to manage AvSE data, the Air Force Equipment 
Management System (AFEMS) was not audit-ready, and the new subsystem in the 
Defense Priorities & Allocation System (DPAS) designed to track the data, the 
Maintenance and Utilization module, is not yet operational. As a result, no hard data 
exists to support modernization. Without health and usage data, or the necessary records 
to prove the impact of AvSE on either readiness or AA, no definitive link can be drawn 
between failing equipment and mission execution.  
Finally, the lack of adequate central data management has resulted in a significant 
loss of minimum requirements documentation. The SERD is one of the documents 
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containing minimum system requirements during a system’s acquisition, but no central 
body has retained these documents. Often no requirements documentation exists in the 
SPOs, and all requirements are maintained and furnished by the original contractor. 
Managers of modernization projects are then forced to perform the arduous task of 
retrieving requirements from original contractors, if the companies still exist. The current 
management structure does not retain basic data to track existing stock numbers, daily 
equipment utilization, or the original requirements and design specifications. Without 
original minimum specifications, design functions, and requirements of the legacy 
system, and all modifications and upgrades, modernization projects will not succeed. 
Acquisition Management 
The two themes managers identified supporting acquisition management as the 
third obstacle to CSE modernization were the misalignment of incentives and existing 
current policies and practices.  
AvSE is part of every major weapon system acquisition (Williams, 1991). These 
programs take years to develop and run concurrently, making it difficult to find a one-
size-fits-all, CSE solution. The advanced weapons developed today require support 
capabilities not available in the current AvSE portfolio, as the defense contractors are 
keenly aware. Because modern capabilities take years to develop, by the time a weapon 
system is ready for AvSE, the Air Force is years behind in the process and has nothing 
new to offer.  
Support Equipment provides a lucrative opportunity for a defense contractor, who 
has no incentive to develop equipment compatible with multiple weapons systems. The 
current policies in place require a contractor to consider existing CSE, but allow the 
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company to outsmart the system, designing tolerances tight enough to preclude the use of 
CSE. Because it takes a significant amount of time to prove that published requirements 
are unnecessarily restrictive and benefit the contractor, most PO’s will not delay the 
acquisition of a new airframe by requiring redesign to accommodate existing CSE. As a 
result, every new airframe acquisition exacerbates the proliferation of PSE, procuring 
highly specialized pieces of equipment to perform tasks relatively common to other 
airframes.  
Financial incentives also counter CSE modernization efforts. Because the expense 
of restarting a production line typically precludes the Air Force from purchasing 
discontinued airframes like the F-22, the Service is strongly incentivized to prioritize the 
initial airframe purchase. If allowed to choose, the Air Force has historically prioritized 
dedicating allocated funds to additional aircraft over the necessary equipment to operate 
those aircraft. The lack of data, discussed as part of the administrative structure obstacle, 
exacerbates this issue. AvSE acquisition is then deferred to a later point.  
The Air Force is also strongly incentivized to progress an airframe through 
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), Initial Operating Capability (IOC), and Full 
Operational Capability (FOC). AvSE acquisition timelines do not naturally coincide with 
airframe timelines, though each stage relies upon AvSE for success. OT&E usually 
results in an early need for AvSE, as testing requirements take time to meet. Because 
AvSE takes time to develop, and the Air Force has not prioritized organic modernization, 
contractors are enabled to provide expensive PSE solutions. This forces the Air Force 
into expensive, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or peculiar equipment that benefits the 
contractors but keeps the larger program on track.  
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The second theme, program management policies and procedures, also provide 
obstacles to CSE modernization. Program Offices follow 63-series AFIs, which are very 
narrow in scope and focus. In turn, they are directed by 10-series AFI requirements, 
providing clear directives through a single lead command. These acquisition programs 
are not subject to any common directives that would require consideration of CSE to 
benefit the larger enterprise.  
Additionally, program offices are not held responsible for their airframes’ 
requirements and rely heavily on AFMC for information specific to their programs. 
SME’s asserted that the program offices were heavily reliant on contractors for basic 
system requirements in multiple interviews. If program offices cannot provide system 
requirements, the coordination necessary to accomplish a CSE modernization project 
across multiple airframes faces a significant obstacle.  
Finally, “rapid acquisition” policies have not been applied to all of the necessary 
organizations to enable the synchronization required to modernize CSE. Without the 
ability to bypass current regulations, CSE triad managers fall further behind accelerated 
programs. 
In summary, two aspects of acquisition management provide significant obstacles 
to CSE modernization. Defense contractors are incentivized to shoehorn the Air Force 
into expensive PSE decisions. Misaligned incentives prioritize purchasing additional 
aircraft over the AvSE required to execute the mission. High visibility weapons systems 
programs prioritize the program’s timeline over the opportunity to modernize and 
consolidate AvSE. No central policy exists to enforce principles of commonality and 
interoperability through CSE. Furthermore, written policy does not require program 
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offices to maintain system requirements, forcing dependence on AFMC and defense 
contractors. As a result of these incentives and policies, the Air Force has an ever-
increasing amount of expensive PSE and failed CSE modernization projects.  
Communication Breakdowns 
The fourth obstacle to CSE modernization, communication breakdowns, initially 
appeared to be a result of the current management structure, but highlights more 
pervasive failures across the enterprise. Multiple interviewees discussed examples of 
communication breakdown, even when the avenues of standardized communication were 
firmly established. For example, the Air Force recently hired a contractor to establish 
sustainment priorities for an airframe’s AvSE. Using survey research, the contractor 
determined which pieces of AvSE most urgently required replacement or upgrade. This 
contract is a symptom of a communication breakdown between end-users and those 
responsible for AvSE sustainment. Air Force organizations should not be reliant upon an 
outside contractor to mediate the communication of priorities and requirements.  
Additionally, though the Log Panel has multiple competing priorities, an avenue 
of modernization funding has always existed for AvSE. For over fifteen years, CSE 
managers have been told that their modernization needs are not critical enough to warrant 
the Log Panel’s attention. Poor communication has resulted in an inaccurate Corporate 
Structure perception of the actual state of CSE. Interviewees described a disconnect 
between the critical nature of AvSE in the chain-of-supportability of mission-generation, 
and Corporate Structure consideration of CSE priorities. Without effective 
communication, the Corporate Structure assumes adequate levels of AvSE and directs 
funding to more urgent priorities.  
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Finally, minimal communication occurs between the innovative branches of the 
Air Force. Organizations like AFWERX, Spark Tank, the Agile Battle Lab (ABL), the 
Air Guard/Air Reserve Test Center (AATC), and AvSE triad members have rarely 
communicated about ongoing projects. Without coordination of requirements and triad 
involvement, even the most promising modernization initiatives will not succeed.  
Communication breakdowns across the enterprise have precluded the success of 
critical modernization projects. The breakdown of established communication channels, 
inaccurate Corporate Structure perception, and an inability for innovation organizations 
to work together has resulted in the CSE fleet’s current state.  
Competing Cultures 
Finally, three aspects of Air Force competing cultures reinforce the fifth 
significant obstacle to CSE modernization. Interviewees pointed to tribalism, end-user 
values, and inter-organizational distrust as cultural breakdowns.  
Members of AvSE management organizations share a common perception that 
tribalism affects almost every modernization initiative. Interviewees described tribalism 
as the prioritization of unit goals at the expense of the priorities of other units or the 
larger organization. Impacting data integrity, resource allocation, and resistance to 
change, tribalism prevents organizations from sharing capability. One example cited 
resistance to automation because of the effect it would have on AGE manning positions. 
Other managers expressed frustration that modernization efforts are frequently obstructed 
because the disruption to the status quo may empower the end-user and threaten the job 
security of supporting roles at the SPO.  
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Wing-level, end-user culture also provides obstacles to CSE modernization. 
Dedicated to the success of the daily flying schedule, Wing exercise, or Air Tasking 
Order, maintenance units possess an unmatched capability to employ assigned resources 
to execute the mission. The Aircraft Maintenance community lives by a “no-fail” 
credence, determined to regenerate aircraft against all odds. Defective AvSE is 
cannibalized, temporarily repaired, Frankensteined together, or replaced with COTS 
solutions using Wing O&M funds. 
However, this patriotic dedication produces an obstacle to CSE modernization. 
Wing exercises, intended to highlight areas of weakness, become drills in “simulated” 
equipment, leading to the assumption that required resources are available to execute the 
mission. When a unit “simulates” the use of equipment that would not be available in a 
wartime scenario, the sorties produced during the exercise are not a true picture of 
capability. As a result, capability gaps are not highlighted because leaders are unwilling 
to let their organizations fail due to equipment. When the mission never fails because of 
equipment, the Corporate Structure does not understand the link between AvSE and the 
mission. In times of war, American patriotic dedication overcomes incredible odds, but 
during peacetime exercises and training missions, obscuring the state of CSE threatens 
future success.  
Finally, inter-organizational distrust reinforces cultural obstacles to CSE 
modernization. Each of the primary management organizations responsible for AvSE 
expressed a perception that top Air Force leaders would rather trust grassroots efforts 
over the expertise of those tasked to modernize. But without expert guidance, grassroots 
efforts usually result in solutions focused on a single problem. Therefore, funds are 
40 
dedicated to AFWERX and Spark Tank ideas with minimal consideration of the larger 
picture.  
In summary, critical aspects of Air Force culture create obstacles to CSE 
modernization. Tribalism intended to protect job security undermines effective 
communication and trust, “Flightline Heroics” obscure the true nature of their 
organization’s capability, and organizations focused on grassroots innovation efforts are 
considered more trustworthy than triad members.  
Obstacle Cycles 
The five obstacles identified by the interviewed experts work in cycles to thwart 
even the most well-articulated and justified modernization efforts. It is necessary to note, 
not all modernization fails are necessarily wrong. In some cases, the different 
organizations provide much-needed checks and balances to counteract stove-piped 
thinking. However, this study focuses on the obstacles to genuine modernization 
requirements.   
Figures 1-3 provide typical examples of modernization obstacles but do not map 
the modernization process completely. They should be interpreted as examples rather 
than the definitive root causes of every CSE modernization project failure.  
Figure 1 provides a visual flowchart of the actions a field unit must take after 
identifying a CSE modernization need. Dashed boxes illustrate a transfer of 
organizational responsibility for a CSE modernization project. Failed modernization 
efforts, illustrated by the dotted boxes, contain one or more of the five obstacles 
identified during this research. 
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Figure 1: Field Level Modernization 
Both the WST at the owning MAJCOM and innovation cells provide 
modernization avenues to the field, but neither can affect CSE change without assistance 
from AFMC. AFMC plays the central role in every CSE modernization project. If a 
genuine modernization requirement does not succeed for any reason, the field is driven to 
circumvent the process with local solutions. Because the field-level units are highly 
motivated to prevent mission failure, rejection or dismissal of a genuine CSE 
modernization need will result in the unit procuring COTS equipment, further 




Figure 2: AFMC Modernization Actions 
The above figure, AFMC Modernization Actions, provides an approximation of 
the actions available to triad organizations to execute a modernization project. The 
coordination required to modernize a CSE asset is considerable, and each step may be 
impeded by one of the five obstacles identified by interviewees. This process is 
characterized by AFMC, the organization primarily tasked with the sustainment of CSE, 
faced with inadequate authority, policy, and resources to achieve change successfully. In 
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the unlikely chance AFMC’s coordination efforts are successful, the modernization 
project enters the Acquisition Process in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Acquisition Process 
The approximation of the acquisition process in Figure 3 is intended to highlight 
two findings. The first is that a successful CSE modernization project requires significant 
coordination by AFMC before the process even begins. The second finding is illustrated 
by the upper branch of the decision tree. In this branch, the Air Force initiates the 
development and purchase of a new airframe or weapon system. AvSE, a critical link in 
the Integrated Product Support (IPS) Elements for logistics support, must be included 
with the purchase. However, current acquisition policy and practice overlooks PSE 
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resources in the current inventory, and enables the contractor to force the Air Force into 
no-win decisions. In most recent cases, the Air Force had to choose between delaying a 
major acquisition program and purchasing expensive, duplicative pieces of PSE.  
The above figures illustrate two key findings of this study: modernization projects 
face more obstacles than paths to success, and AFMC is central to every successful 
project. Without significant coordination, the identification of a modernization need by 
the field usually leads to PSE proliferation or “Flightline Heroics.” 
The interviews, documents, and reports collected to answer Research Question 1 
were categorized into five categories: Inadequate Resources, Administrative Structure, 
Acquisition Management, Communication Breakdowns, and Competing Cultures. Each 
obstacle compounds upon the others to render most CSE modernization efforts as 
failures. These obstacles are usually not a result of a poor work ethic or laziness, but 
emerge from each organization’s different policies, incentives, and cultures. The data 
collection process uncovered hard-working, patriotic Americans who were frustrated by 
obstacles and forced into repetitive cycles that usually resulted in failure to modernize.  
  
RQ 2: What are the consequences to the Air Force mission and objectives due to those 
obstacles? 
After identifying the five obstacles to CSE modernization, interviewees were 
asked to discuss the probable consequences of a failure to modernize. The responses were 
categorized into three themes: Agility, Financial Waste, and Mission Surety. These 
themes provide examples of the consequences of the identified obstacles. This thesis does 
45 
not attempt to adjudicate each situation, but provides patterns of the consequences of 
modernization failures.  
Agility 
The first consequence of failed CSE modernization is degraded Air Force agility. 
As the Global War on Terror has drawn to a close, the NSS and NDS have refocused the 
DoD on preparing for conflict with peer-level adversaries. Unlike the dominance the Air 
Force has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War, technologically advanced adversaries 
will not allow the use of superbases, quickly disrupting our predictable supply chains and 
logistics tails. As American rivals grow in power, the Air Force must adopt a lighter 
footprint. Agile Combat Employment (ACE), the Air Force response to the call for 
agility, demands a large reserve of reliable, flexible prepositioned equipment. Every 
AvSE manager interviewed asserted that the current fleet of CSE is insufficient for this 
type of warfare. Three former MAJCOM-level planners cited AvSE as the biggest 
impediment to large-scale warfare, because of the amount of airlift required to deploy the 
required equipment.  
Equipment footprints and airlift requirements provide the biggest impediment to 
adaptive basing concepts. The Service’s newest fighter, the F-35, is supported almost 
exclusively with PSE. This means a small forward-deployed contingent of F-22s, F-15Es, 
and F-35s would each require significant airlift, supported by duplicative equipment 
items without any interoperability. The current, highly-specialized AvSE footprints 





The second consequence of a failure to modernize CSE is significant financial 
waste. The annual nature of O&M funds forces Program Offices to participate in 
expensive catch-up projects during airframe modifications and other targets of 
opportunity. Long-term funds have not been available to provide predictable, stable 
planning in order to clarify requirements and reduce cost. In many cited cases, 
modernization projects used money earmarked for other essential purposes, diluting both 
projects’ effectiveness.  
The five obstacles to CSE modernization also produce a proliferation of PSE and 
duplicative equipment items. Subject matter experts described examples of equipment 
that perform identical tasks but only interface with a specific aircraft. Another example 
cited duplication of indoor and outdoor equipment, forcing the enterprise to sustain two 
unique products because of a lack of coordination during these items’ procurement. In a 
final example of financial waste, Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) resources were 
dedicated to testing power pull requirements on legacy airframes because the basic 
system requirements data no longer existed. Catch-up contracts, duplicative equipment, 
and missing requirements data provide three examples of financial waste as a result of the 
five modernization obstacles.  
Mission Surety 
The final theme identified as a consequence of failed CSE modernization is 
mission surety, defined by this thesis as “the confidence of mission success.” AvSE 
managers understand the cybersecurity vulnerabilities inherent to outdated equipment 
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operating in a modern environment. Without proper research and coordination, CSE may 
be exploited by an adversary.  
Even more troubling, AvSE managers feel that key Air Force decision-makers 
likely do not understand the growing capability gap of the current CSE fleet. As a result 
of unclear or nonexistent AvSE policy, the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) 
contains highly subjective, unstandardized CSE status reports. MAJCOM managers 
reported a disconnect unit equipment requests for support, and DRRS report contents. 
These reports often obscure the current status of assigned CSE assets, as units lack clear 
guidance for AvSE status reporting. 
Finally, decentralized management of AvSE results in hoarding. Units do not trust 
AFMC’s ability to backfill reallocated equipment and are concerned that turned-in 
equipment impedes a unit’s ability to execute their assigned mission. As a result, 
equipment is hoarded, stockpiled, and pillaged, decreasing the effectiveness of the larger 
mission.  
The consequences of CSE modernization failures are dire. While the loss of 
American lives may sound hyperbolic, interviewees each expressed concern that AvSE is 
a blind spot, and will soon degrade each of the nine of the twelve Air Force core 
functions discussed in Chapter I. In the words of one planning expert: “We don’t have the 
stuff that we need, and the stuff we do have isn’t ready.” 
 
RQ 3: What actions should Air Force policy-makers take to address those obstacles? 
To address the identified obstacles and catalyze CSE modernization, SMEs 
identified three categories of changes that policy-makers should make. These three 
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categories, Policy, Resource, and Cultural Changes, all reside within the scope of control 
of various management organizations. Many of these changes are currently in 
development by the triad organizations, but require Corporate Structure support to 
achieve successful implementation. These proposed actions originate from AvSE 
management experts, and are not primarily attributable to the author.  
Policy Changes 
The first policy change recommended to Air Force leaders is the establishment of 
written, enterprise-level guidance for AvSE management. Akin to AFI21-101 for Aircraft 
Maintenance and AFI24-302, a 21-series AvSE AFI would fill the current void by 
standardizing definitions and modernization processes, providing a standard, objective 
AvSE DRRS report, and giving AFMC lead command authority. The new policy would 
also give SPOs a mandate to modernize and consolidate CSE, reducing PSE proliferation 
and eliminating equipment duplication. This instruction would align AvSE management 
with the directives of the NSS, NDS, and Air Force policy.  
The second recommended policy action was an enterprise-wide sprint to 
document airframe requirements. Across the Air Force, basic technical specifications and 
requirements should be recorded for every airframe and maintained independently of 
their original contractors. This effort would take tremendous manpower but pay 
dividends during future sustainment efforts. Led by requirements professionals in the A5 
and A8 communities, documented requirements would catalyze mission surety. The 
result of this sprint would be Program Offices providing single sources of data as 
designed.  
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One interviewee recommended the realignment of the triad under Air Force 
Acquisition, giving AvSE managers insight into future programs and priorities. In some 
ways, CSE modernization shares more similarity with the Acquisition Community than 
the Logistics Community. This expert argued that organizational links to the needs of the 
fighter, bomber, mobility, ISR, and weapons acquisition communities would enable 
modernization efforts. Established lines of coordination would facilitate requirements 
sharing, enabling the alignment of AvSE requirements under one CSE solution.  
A policy requiring a reduction in equipment footprint size, both in size and 
quantity, may also drive an increased focus on CSE modernization. The ACE mission 
demands flexibility, but lacks the written policy to change the tactical reality of PSE 
proliferation.  
These policy changes should be undertaken to clarify roles and responsibilities, 
carefully avoiding creating additional bureaucratic processes to deter progress. As CSE 
modernization programs succeed, the Air Force will offer more common capabilities, 
bypassing many of the identified obstacles.  
Resource Changes 
To overcome current obstacles to CSE modernization, managers also 
recommended resource changes. Financial stability is a critical foundation to CSE 
modernization and requires a reliable source of funding. Under the Log Panel, 
modernization advocates should have access to an influential champion, equivalent in 
rank to other critical programs. Directly enabling nine of twelve Core Functions, CSE 
needs a dedicated representative singularly focused on portfolio requirements. HAF and 
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Congressional leaders need to understand the dire condition of AvSE and dedicate 
reliable funding to avoid mission failure.   
Policy changes empowering and tasking AFMC with modernization authority 
should be coupled with the necessary manpower to execute that tasking. Current 
manpower levels are unable to balance both daily management and future priorities 
effectively. To better understand the current need, a manpower study of the MAJCOM 
should be accomplished.  
A final resource change suggested by one interviewee was the standup of an 
experimentation cell within AFRL. This new team could partner with AFIT and AFMC, 
both collocated at Wright-Patterson AFB, to work with industry to develop organic CSE 
solutions. Tasked explicitly with the development of common solutions, the new AFRL 
cell would possess both inside-access to the Air Force mission and direct lines of 
communication with industry partners.  
Culture Changes 
The third category of actions to counteract modernization obstacles would require 
cultural changes. Interservice cross-talk should not only occur in locked vaults, but 
acquisition and sustainment managers should have open lines of communication within 
the DoD. For example, the Marines, famously expert at expeditionary operations, could 
inform Air Force AvSE managers during the current pivot to adaptive basing. One 
manager described how the Army has standardized “6T” battery technology, presenting 
attractive applications for Air Force AvSE. Air Force managers of all types should 
emulate the Operations Community’s integration with sister services.  
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Another cultural change must take place within the Air Force Acquisition 
Community. For rapid aircraft acquisition to be successful, AvSE managers must be 
considered and included in the early stages of program development. The current lack of 
ability to provide input results in vague requirements, late-to-need equipment, and the 
proliferation of expensive, highly-specialized AvSE.  
Finally, field-level logisticians must be willing to accept mission failure under key 
training conditions to highlight the true nature of the AvSE fleet. The culture of 
“Flightline Heroics” has allowed the United States total air dominance for the last 30 
years but threatens future mission success. Without an accurate picture of capability gaps, 
resources are misallocated. For the mission to succeed in the future, it must be allowed to 
fail today.  
The proposed policy, resource, and culture changes do not address every aspect of 
the identified obstacles but would provide practical steps toward a robust, flexible fleet of 
CSE. Air Force policy-makers have the power to overcome the five CSE modernization 
obstacles through policy, resource, and cultural changes.  
Summary 
This chapter discussed the results of the data collection process described in 
Chapter III. The opinions and views of the interviewed SMEs were categorized into five 
obstacles to CSE modernization: Inadequate Resources, Administrative Structure, 
Acquisition Management, Communication Breakdowns, and Competing Cultures. 
Research Question Two uncovered the dire consequences of a pattern of CSE 
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modernization failures. Finally, Research Question Three summarized the proposed 
Policy, Resource, and Cultural changes to Air Force decision-makers.  
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions of Research 
The $13 billion Common Support Equipment portfolio directly impacts national 
security by enabling nine of the twelve Air Force Core Functions. Critically out-of-date, 
the fleet’s $2 billion disconnect between current capability and authorized levels has 
provided a moment of reckoning for AvSE managers. Unable to effectively manage both 
sustainment and modernization of CSE, insufficient resources have forced AFMC into 
crisis management.  
Subject Matter Experts from Headquarters Air Force, Air Force Materiel 
Command, Pacific Air Forces, the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, the Air 
National Guard, the Air Force Research Laboratory, Acquisition Program Managers, and 
individual System Program Offices and Weapon Systems Teams identified five obstacles 
to CSE modernization: Inadequate Resources, Administrative Structure, Acquisition 
Management, Communication Breakdowns, and Competing Cultures.  
For the last fifteen years, the Resources dedicated to AvSE have decreased 
dramatically, partially as a result of consolidation under Centralized Asset Management 
and the Support Equipment Transformation. Starved of Investment Funds and reliant on 
annual Operations and Maintenance dollars, the equipment fleet is frozen in time, unable 
to both cover current needs and accomplish modernization projects. Competing priorities, 
coupled with minimal managerial manpower, have relegated resources to a few annual 
priorities, leading to a fleet-wide readiness decline.  
The current AvSE Administrative Structure provides the second obstacle to CSE 
modernization. A vacuum of strategic vision and authority has produced siloed spending 
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and allowed Air Combat Command, Global Strike Command, Air Force Special 
Operations Command, and Air Mobility Command to stonewall the development of 
common solutions. The absence of enterprise-level management of AvSE blurs lines of 
communication, results in ambiguous processes, and produces duplicative pieces of 
equipment. The current Administrative Structure also has resulted in significant data loss. 
Missing minimum system requirements, usage data, and equipment status obscure the 
true state of mission capability, and deter the Corporate Structure from approving 
modernization projects.  
The third obstacle, Acquisition Management, obstructs modernization through the 
misalignment of incentives and through current policies and practices. Acquisition 
incentives, under pressure from Congress and Headquarters Air Force, prioritize 
airframes on the ramp, even at the expense of the equipment required to employ those 
airframes. As a result, the larger fleet has lower capability rates than a smaller, properly 
equipped fleet.  
The prioritization of timeliness also allows defense contractors to corner 
acquisition professionals into expensive peculiar equipment solutions. Even though 
AFI63-101 directs Program Managers to maximize the use of common equipment, 
today’s out-of-date CSE fleet enables contractors to circumvent efforts to consolidate and 
modernize equipment.  
Current policies and practices in Acquisition Management counter modernization 
projects by allowing Program Offices to rely on defense contractors for basic system 
requirements. Furthermore, no current policy requires Program Offices to collaborate on 
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CSE requirements. Acquisition Management incentives, policies, and practices must be 
addressed for CSE modernization efforts to be successful.  
Communication Breakdowns are the fourth obstacle to CSE modernization. 
Managers cited examples of contractors facilitating communication between Air Force 
organizations, when established lines of communication were unable to reach consensus. 
Poor communication has resulted in a Corporate Structure impression that CSE does not 
require significant resources or higher priority. Members of the AvSE management triad 
expressed frustration that AFWERX, Spark Tank, and other innovation cells do not 
collaborate during AvSE modernization projects, often leading to an incomplete 
understanding of the requirements.  
The fifth obstacle, Competing Cultures, impedes CSE modernization projects 
through tribalism, values, and distrust. Hoarding capability at the local level, unit 
tribalism impacts data integrity, resource allocation, and produces a resistance to change. 
When units “simulate” equipment during exercises, utilizing resources that would not be 
available in a wartime scenario, their no-fail culture conceals mission-capability gaps. 
Finally, triad managers described interorganizational distrust; the tendency of Air Force 
leaders to prefer grassroots modernization efforts over the projects originating from 
AFMC.  
These five obstacles have resulted in serious consequences to the Air Force’s 
agility, finances, and mission. Though the aging fleet of equipment impacts day-to-day 
operations on the flightline, more serious consequences lurk beneath the surface. 
Operating from superbases, the force is anchored to large fleets of peculiar equipment 
that preclude the agile, flexible force prescribed in the National Security Strategy and the 
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National Defense Strategy. MAJCOM planners cited AvSE footprints as their single 
greatest mobility concern during wartime contingency planning. Furthermore, these 
obstacles have enabled the F-35 to be supported almost entirely by peculiar equipment, 
sharing marginal commonality with other Air Force assets.  
The obstacles to CSE modernization have also resulted in significant financial 
waste. Expensive catch-up projects neglect opportunities to consolidate capability and 
have produced 50 to 100 duplicative equipment items. Some of the nation’s highest 
priority assets, like the E4-B, are forced into expensive work-arounds due to unreliable 
AvSE. When interoperable, modern common equipment items are not available, the 
acquisition of new airframes leads the Service down a path of increased AvSE cost, 
complexity, and specificity through additional PSE.  
The third, and most serious, consequence as a result of the five obstacles is the 
erosion of mission surety. Managers of all levels of AvSE management expressed 
concern that top Air Force leaders may not have an accurate sight picture of the current 
state of AvSE. The absence of accurate data collection, coupled with vague AvSE policy, 
have produced highly subjective, unstandardized DRRS reports. Though the Air Force 
does not use DRRS reports to rate a commander’s effectiveness, remnants of past culture 
discourage complete transparency. Unit tribalism and equipment hoarding further obscure 
the true state of a vital link in the logistics chain. All interviewed levels of AvSE 
management expressed a deep concern that CSE is an Air Force blind spot, and will soon 
degrade the Service’s ability to execute its Core Functions.  
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Recommendations for Action 
Though CSE faces significant obstacles to modernization, and the consequences 
of an outdated fleet are dire, AvSE managers were confident that focused changes to 
policy, resources, and culture could adjust the current trajectory. These changes should 
carefully avoid imposing additional bureaucracy and focus on the removal of roadblocks 
as the Air Force “Accelerates Change” (Brown, 2020). 
To overcome current obstacles, AvSE policy should by codified in a single-source 
AFI, standardizing definitions and modernization processes, providing uniform data 
reporting criteria, giving AFMC lead command authority, and requiring thorough 
coordination during the acquisition process. Furthermore, all AvSE managers strongly 
recommended that the Air Force buy the complete specifications of every item procured.  
To tackle the current lack of system requirements, an enterprise-wide sprint 
should document airframe requirements. Though significant manpower would be 
required, the consolidation of requirements would catalyze modernization and 
sustainment efforts across the force. A final policy change might also require the 
reduction of equipment proliferation, reducing duplicative items and consolidating to 
common equipment.  
Secondly, managers recommended focused resource changes. The Air Force 
Corporate Structure should be empowered to inform HAF and Congressional leaders 
about the current need through improved data management and interpretation. However, 
decision makes cannot afford to wait until DPAS “solves” the current lack of data. 
Current AFMC manpower levels preclude concurrent management and modernization of 
the 533,000 item CSE portfolio. A manpower study of AvSE management organizations 
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should be accomplished, with clear delineation of roles and responsibilities. With 
adequate manning, triad organizations will be better equipped to articulate CSE 
requirements to the Logistics Panel.  
Finally, leaders in the logistics enterprise should encourage cultural changes. The 
Operations community’s admirable cross-talk with other service branches should be 
emulated in both acquisitions and logistics. Marine expeditionary logistics and Army 
equipment standardization hold valuable corporate knowledge often untapped by Air 
Force professionals. The culture of siloed thinking should also be addressed in the 
acquisition community. Though incentives reward speed and cost, each program holds 
the potential to improve Air Force logistics by capitalizing on modernization 
opportunities. Finally, Wing-level leaders should clearly articulate the importance of 
presenting an accurate capability sight picture during exercises and status reports. No unit 
wants to fail a mission-generation exercise, but to safeguard future mission surety, 
capability limits and gaps must be identified today.  
Future Research 
The AvSE enterprise is rich with opportunities for future research. Built on the 
foundation of Bayer (2003), Leighton (2017), and Bobic (2018), a quantitative link 
between CSE assets and mission capability could be modeled. The impact of PSE on 
airlift requirements may also provide useful insight. The five obstacles to CSE 
modernization could each be explored in more detail and evaluated through a survey of 
the larger logistics enterprise. One interviewee mentioned the environmental impacts of 
the continued use of the A/M32-60B generator, which emits a deafening roar during use 
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and consumes large amounts of fuel. The study could focus on technician health, 
impediments to communication, and sustainment costs of the generator. Modernization 
could be explored with a wider lens, investigating successful efforts in other Services or 
Air Force organizations. Finally, a future study could focus on the detailed policy, 
resource, and cultural changes necessary to enable successful modernization efforts.    
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